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On 27 June 2018 Indonesians were asked to elect [1] governors, district heads and mayors in 17
provinces, 115 districts and 39 municipalities.
Elections for local government heads in Indonesia are largely performative [2] events that do not
deliver much to ordinary citizens [3] in terms of improved public services [4] or genuinely
progressive politicians. In fact, direct elections for local government heads have facilitated the
rise of political dynasties [5] to such a degree that BBC Indonesia felt compelled to create an 
online tool [6] for the 2018 local elections that allowed voters to identify the family links that
candidates in their district have to incumbents.
Yet despite their shortcomings, Indonesia’s local elections remain surprisingly dynamic affairs [7]
. Political dynasties have struggled to entrench themselves in Indonesian politics to the degree
that their counterparts in the Philippines or even Thailand have managed.
A unique combination of economic and institutional factors explains why the outcomes of local
government elections in Indonesia are hard to predict.
Local political monopolies usually emerge if incumbents manage to either dominate economic
resources or political institutions. For example, enduring political systems appeared throughout
history where the local topography allowed rulers to encage populations (like a fertile but narrow
river bed, or a confined number of trade routes through mountainous terrain). The agricultural
surplus that could be extracted from people under such circumstances was subsequently used
to establish enduring political systems.
                               page 1 / 4
East Asia Forum
Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia
and the Pacific
http://www.eastasiaforum.org
A modern day equivalent of such monopolies can be found in the Philippines. There, the most
enduring political dynasties are those that establish monopolistic control over important 
economic resources [8] in their jurisdiction, which they subsequently use to ‘lock-in’ electorates.
Alternatively, incumbents and their offspring manage to capture the local state through the
manipulation of institutions. In South America, for instance, many political dynasties survive
across multiple election cycles because they successfully control the boundaries [9] to their
jurisdictions from outside attacks. They do so by adopting electoral rules that work in their
favour, by creating local tax codes that allow them to control revenue flows or by manipulating
regulations for political parties.
In Indonesia, political dynasties struggle to entrench themselves in local politics because local
economic conditions do not lend themselves to monopolisation. As a consequence the
Indonesian electorate has high economic autonomy.
Land concentration is relatively low in Indonesia compared to other Southeast Asian countries.
In areas where land concentration is high, land is often owned by national elites with no stake in
local politics, making it difficult for local politicians to create economic dependencies. The
proliferation of new employment opportunities in Indonesia’s rural areas over past decades has
added to the challenges of local incumbents to create and use economic dependencies to their
advantage. Likewise, large-scale industrialisation is absent in Indonesia and the few sizeable
industrial assets scattered across the archipelago are usually not under the control of local
politicians. In short, Indonesian voters may be poor, but they are also relatively free.
At the same time, the institutional framework of Indonesia’s decentralised unitary state makes it
difficult for incumbents to rig institutions in their favour. For instance, re-writing electoral rules to
one’s advantage is difficult since they fall under the authority of the national election
commission. The police and the army are also under national authority in Indonesia while the
prosecutor’s office reports to the national level. Unlike incumbents in South America’s federal
democracies, Indonesian local politicians cannot bring these political resources under their 
formal control. The manipulation of budget allocations is equally challenging for local politicians
because Indonesian localities receive on average 90 per cent of their revenues from the
national level through block grants.
This means that incumbents in Indonesia are relatively vulnerable to electoral attacks since they
rarely control economic monopolies while institutional resources are not easily captured.
A case in point is the demise of the Limpo dynasty in South Sulawesi province. Numerous
members of the Yasin Limpo family have managed to win executive and legislative elections.
Syahrul Yasin Limpo, the oldest son of a locally known military general, became district head of
Gowa (a suburb of the provincial capital Makassar) in 1994. His younger brother Ichsan Yasin
Limpo became the first directly elected district head of Gowa in 2005, while Syahrul won the
gubernatorial race for South Sulawesi in 2007 and was re-elected in 2013. Ichsan, meanwhile,
was re-elected as district head of Gowa in 2010.
In 2018, with Syahrul having reached the end of his second term and unable to stand for
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re-election, Ichsan ran as governor to replace him. But exit polls conducted across the province
on 27 June placed Ichsan third, with only 19.30 per cent [10] of total votes.
The difficulties that political dynasties face when trying to establish local political monopolies
may seem like good news for Indonesia’s democracy. But while predatory elites struggle to
entrench themselves in local politics, so do progressive politicians. Successful reform
governments [11] in other democracies have relied on monopolistic government arrangements as
much as local dynasties.
Unfortunately, the most likely future scenario for local politics in Indonesia is one where different
predatory networks compete for power and the support of the electorate without providing much
in terms of policy agendas that address the country’s many problems.
Michael Buehler is a Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the School of Oriental and
African Studies (SOAS) University of London. He is the author of The Politics of Shari’a Law:
Islamic Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia [12] (Cambridge University Press,
2018). 
A more extensive analysis of Indonesia’s local government head elections by Michael Buehler
titled ‘The Ephemeral Nature of Local Political Monopolies’ is available here [13]
. 
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